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This paper compares four current theories of expertise with respect to chess 
players’ memory: Chase and Simon’s (1973) chunking theory, Holding’s 
(1985) SEEK theory, Ericsson and Kintsch’s (1995) long-term working 
memory theory, and Gobet and Simon’s (1996b) template theory. The 
empirical areas showing the largest discriminative power include recall of 
random and distorted positions, recall with very short presentation times,  and 
interference studies. Contrary to recurrent criticisms in the literature, it is 
shown that the chunking theory is consistent with most of the data. However, 
the best performance in accounting for the empirical evidence is obtained by 
the template theory. The theory, which unifies low-level aspects of cognition, 
such as chunks, with high-level aspects, such as schematic knowledge and 
planning, proposes that chunks are accessed through a discrimination net, 
where simple perceptual features are tested, and that they can evolve into more 
complex data structures (templates) specific to classes of positions. 
Implications for the study of expertise in general include the need for detailed 
process models of expert behavior and the need to use empirical data spanning 




A Comparison of Four Theories  
 
Understanding what makes experts so good in their domain of expertise is a 
traditional field of psychology, which goes back at least to Binet’s (1894, 1966) 
monograph on the psychology of skilled mental calculators and chessplayers 
(see Bryan & Harter, 1899, Cleveland, 1907, or Djakow, Petrowski and Rudik, 
1927 for other early examples). Recently, cognitive science has produced a 
wealth of empirical data on expertise, and several theoretical explanations have 
been proposed. In particular, research on expert memory has been flourishing, 
gathering a large amount of data, which have sufficient power to test current 
theories. It is timely then to compare some of the main contenders. 
 With this goal in mind, two main approaches are possible: to compare 
theories across several domains, emphasizing the general principles stressed by 
each theory, or to focus on a particular domain, analyzing in detail the 
explanations offered by each theory. The latter approach has been chosen in 
this paper, perhaps to counterbalance the rather strong tendency within the field 
to offer general, but sometimes vague, explanatory frameworks. Chess, with its 
long tradition in scientific psychology, its rich database of observational and 
experimental data, and the presence of several detailed theories, some of them 
implemented as computer programs, appears as a domain of choice to carry out 
such a theoretical comparison. 
 The first section of this paper emphasizes the scientific advantages offered 
by the study of chess players. The second section presents three leading 
approaches to studying expertise: the chunking theory (Chase & Simon, 
1973b), the knowledge-based paradigm (e.g., Chi, Glaser, and Rees, 1982), and 
the skilled-memory theory (Chase & Ericsson, 1982), which has recently been 
extended in the long-term working memory (LT-WM) theory (Ericsson & 
Kintsch, 1995). The third section shows how these approaches to expertise 
have been applied to chess memory. Four theories are presented: Chase and 
Simon’s (1973b) chunking theory and Ericsson and Kintsch’s (1995) LT-WM 
theory are direct applications to chess of their general theories; Holding’s 
SEEK theory (1985, 1992) is a prime example of the knowledge approach in 
the domain of chess; finally, Gobet and Simon’s (1996b) template theory is an 
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elaboration of the chunking theory and includes concepts derived both from the 
skilled-memory theory and the knowledge-based paradigm. In the fourth 
section, these four theories are set against empirical work conducted during the 
last twenty years or so on chess memory. In the conclusion, the respective 
explanatory power of these theories for chess memory is discussed, and 
implications are drawn for the study of expertise in general. 
 The reader who has come across several reviews of chess expertise in recent 
years (e.g., Charness, 1989, 1992; Cranberg & Albert, 1988; Gobet, 1993a; 
Holding, 1985, 1992; Lories, 1984) may wonder why a new theoretical article 
should be written on this topic. There are two main reasons. First, several 
theoretically important empirical results have been published recently (Cooke, 
Atlas, Lane, & Berger, 1993; De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet & Simon, 1996b, 
1996c; Saariluoma, 1992, 1994), as well as a rebuttal of a widely cited result 
about the lack of skill effect in the recall of random positions (Gobet & Simon, 
1996a). Second, two new theories (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Gobet & Simon, 
1996b) have been proposed recently to address deficiencies of the classical 
Chase and Simon theory. No previous review has systematically put these two 
theories (as well as others) to the test of empirical data. 
Advantages of Chess as a Research Domain 
Before getting into the substance of this paper, it may be useful to discuss the 
advantages offered by chess as a domain of comparison, and to estimate how 
the conclusions of this comparison may be generalized to other domains. 
Historically, chess has been one of the main sources of the scientific study of 
expertise, a rapidly developing field of cognitive science. Its impact on 
cognitive science in general is important (Charness, 1992) for several reasons 
(see Gobet, 1993a, for a more detailed discussion): (a) the chess domain offers 
strong external validity; (b) it also offers strong ecological validity (Neisser, 
1976); (c) it is a complex task, requiring several years of training to reach 
professional level; (d) it offers a rich database of games played by competitors 
of different skill levels which may be used to study the chess environment 
statistically; (e) it is a relatively “clean” domain that is easily formalizable 
mathematically or with computer languages; (f) its flexible environment allows 
many experimental manipulations; (g) it allows for a cross-fertilization with 
artificial intelligence; (h) it offers a precise scale quantifying players’ expertise 
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(the ELO rating;1 see Elo, 1978); and finally, (i) it permits the study of 
cognitive processes both at a low level (e.g., reaction time to detect the 
presence of pieces on the board) and at a high level (e.g., choice of a move after 
several minutes of deliberation), providing valuable data for the cognitive study 
of both basic processes and high-level aspects of expertise.  
 The first point mentioned, external validity, is obviously an essential 
prerequisite if one wants to go beyond the limits of a specific domain. Chess 
fares well on that point: the basic result of De Groot (1946/1965) and Chase 
and Simon (1973a, 1973b)—experts’ superiority over novices with meaningful 
material in their domain of expertise—has been replicated in different domains, 
such as GO and gomuku (Eisenstadt & Kareev, 1977; Reitman, 1976); bridge 
(Engle & Bukstel, 1978; Charness, 1979); music (Sloboda, 1976); electronics 
(Egan & Schwartz, 1979); programming (Shneiderman, 1976; McKeithen, 
Reitman, Rueter & Hirtle, 1981); and basketball (Allard, Graham & Paarsalu, 
1980). 
Current Approaches to Expertise 
Research on expertise has been one of the most active fields of cognitive 
science over the last two decades (Patel, Kaufman, & Magder, 1996). A huge 
amount of empirical data has been collected in various domains, including 
physics, mathematics, chess, baseball, golf, medical expertise, to name only a 
few (see Ericsson & Lehman, 1996, for a review). In addition, several 
influential paradigms have been proposed to account for expert behavior, 
including Soar (Newell, 1990), ACT* (Anderson, 1983), Chase and Simon’s 
(1973b) chunking theory, Chase and Ericsson’s (1982) skilled memory theory 
and its successor Ericsson and Kintsch’s (1995) long-term working memory 
theory, and what can be called the “knowledge-based paradigm,” which 
incorporates a group of authors mainly stressing the necessity of a well 
organized database of knowledge. In this paper, I will focus on the last three of 
these paradigms. 
The Chunking Theory 
The chunking theory (Chase and Simon, 1973) is indissociable from EPAM 
(Feigenbaum, 1963; Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984; Simon, 1989; Richman & 
Simon, 1989), a general theory of cognition. It proposes that expertise in a 
domain is acquired by learning a large database of chunks, indexed by a 
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discrimination net, where tests are carried out about features of the perceptual 
stimuli. The discrimination net allows a rapid categorization of domain-specific 
patterns and accounts for the speed with which experts “see” the key elements 
in a problem situation. The theory incorporates several parameters specifying 
known limits of the human information-processing system, such as short-term 
memory capacity (about 7 chunks), time to carry out a test in the discrimination 
net (10 ms), or time to learn a new chunk (about 8 s).  
 Chunks also play the role of conditions of productions (Newell & Simon, 
1972): each familiar chunk in LTM is a condition that may be satisfied by the 
recognition of the perceptual pattern and that evokes an action. Productions 
explain the rapid solutions that experts typically propose and offer a theoretical 
account of “intuition” (Simon, 1986). The fact that experts in many domains 
(e.g., physics, Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980; chess, De Groot, 
1946; mathematics, Hinsley, Hayes, & Simon, 1977) use forward search when 
solving a problem, while novices work backwards, is taken as evidence that 
experts make heavy use of productions based on pattern recognition. Chunks 
also give access to semantic memory consisting of productions and schemas, 
although this aspect of the theory is less worked out (Simon, 1989). 
 The presence of chunks also explains why, notwithstanding the limits of 
STM, experts can recall larger amounts of information than novices: instead of 
storing each element separately in STM, experts can store chunks that have 
been built up in LTM. Finally, the theory postulates that it takes a long time (at 
least 10 years of practice and study) to learn the large amount of chunks (from 
10,000 to 100,000) necessary to be an expert. It is fair to say that this theory has 
spawned most of the current work on expertise, carried out not in small part to 
refute some of its predictions. 
The Knowledge-Based Paradigm 
The second theoretical framework—it is not possible to pinpoint a specific 
theory as in the two other cases—stresses the role of high-level, conceptual 
knowledge, sometimes referring to the levels-of-processing theory (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972). From this point of view, experts differ not only in the 
quantitative amount of knowledge (as proposed by Chase & Simon, 1973), but 
also in its qualitative organization. For example, Chi, Glaser, and Rees (1982) 
showed that experts organize physics problems at a more abstract level than 
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novices, who pay attention mostly to surface features. Typically, experts’ 
knowledge is organized hierarchically.  Similar qualitative differences have 
been found in other domains, such as medical expertise (Patel & Groen, 1991), 
programming (Adelson, 1984), or chess (Cooke et al., 1993). It was also shown 
that the type of knowledge representation used influences the flexibility with 
which problems are represented (Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon,  1980) 
and the type of search used (Bhaskar & Simon, 1977). 
  Several formalisms have been used to model experts knowledge—and 
knowledge in general, for that matter— including production systems (Larkin, 
1981), semantic networks (Rumelhart, Lindsay, & Norman, 1972), frames 
(Minsky, 1977), and trees (Reitman & Rueter, 1980). [See Reitman-Olson and 
Biolsi (1991) for a useful review of techniques used for eliciting and 
representing knowledge.]  Finally, empirical work has also validated some of 
the assumptions of this framework. An important source of evidence for this 
approach comes from the engineering field of expert systems (e.g., Jackson, 
1990), where computer programs are written to represent and use experts’ 
knowledge at levels of performance close to humans’. While this paradigm 
could, in principle, coexist with the chunking theory, as proposed by Simon 
and his colleagues, it has mostly evolved in an independent direction. 
The Skilled-Memory and Long-Term Working Memory Theories 
As we will see later with respect to chess memory, two sets of empirical data 
are hard to account for by the chunking theory: (a) Experts keep a good 
memory for domain-specific material even after a task has been interpolated 
between the presentation of the material and its recall; and (b) Experts can 
memorize large amounts of rapidly presented material that would either require 
learning chunks faster than is proposed by the theory or a STM capacity larger 
than 7 chunks. The skilled memory theory (Chase & Ericsson, 1982; Ericsson 
& Staszewski, 1989; Staszewski, 1990) precisely addresses these two 
questions, mostly using data from the digit-span task, and explains experts’ 
remarkable memory in various domains through three principles: (a) 
Information is encoded with numerous and elaborated cues related to prior 
knowledge; (b) Time required by encoding and retrieval operations decreases 
with practice: and (c) Retrieval structures are developed. According to Ericsson 
and Staszewski (1989, p. 239), “experts develop memory mechanisms called 
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retrieval structures to facilitate the retrieval of information stored in LTM. [...] 
[R]etrieval structures are used strategically to encode information in LTM with 
cues that can be later regenerated to retrieve the stored information efficiently 
without a lengthy search.” 
 This approach has been applied mainly to mnemonists, though it has also 
been applied to some skills where memory develops as a side-product, such as 
mental calculation. A good example of such a retrieval structure is offered by 
the method of loci, in which one learns a general encoding scheme using 
various locations. During the presentation of material to learn, associations 
(retrieval cues) are made between the locations and the items to be learnt. An 
important aspect of this theory is that experts must activate their retrieval 
structure before the material is presented, and that, in the case of very rapid 
presentation of items (e.g., one second per item) the structure can be applied 
successfully to encode only one type of material (e.g., digits) without transfer to 
other material. In summary, the development of expert memory includes both 
creating a retrieval structure and learning to use it efficiently. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 Recently, Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) have extended the skilled memory 
theory into the long-term working memory (LT-WM) theory. They propose that 
cognitive processes occur as a sequence of stable states representing end 
products of processing, and that acquired memory skills allow these end 
products to be stored in LTM. Depending upon the requirements of the task 
domain, encoding occurs either through a retrieval structure, or through a 
knowledge-based, elaborated structure associating items to other items or to the 
context (schemas and other patterns in LTM), or both (see Figure 1).2 The 
former type of encoding predicts that, due to the presence of retrieval cues, 
relatively good recall should be observed even when the presentation time was 
not sufficient for elaborating LTM schemas. Note that the LT-WM theory 
proposes that working memory has a larger capacity than is traditionally 
proposed, for example by Baddeley and Hitch's (Baddeley, 1986) working 
memory theory. Ericsson and Kintsch applied their theory to digit-span 
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memory, memory for menu orders, mental multiplication, mental abacus 
calculation, chess, medical expertise, and text comprehension. 
Current Theories of Expert Memory in Chess 
This section presents four current theories that have been proposed to account 
for expert memory in general and chessplayers’ memory in particular. The first 
three theories instantiate the general theories of expertise discussed above; the 
last theory proposes an integration of these three approaches, building 
particularly from chunking theory. Each will be illustrated by giving its 
explanation for the standard chess memory task (recall of a game position 
presented for 5 s). 
The Chunking Theory 
Chase and Simon’s theory was so influenced by De Groot’s (1946/1965) 
experimental and theoretical work on chess psychology that it may be worth 
dwelling on this study for a while. This will also provide the opportunity to 
present the typical experimental paradigm of chess research. 
 De Groot’s effort was mainly devoted to a qualitative description of the 
processes chess players carry out to choose a move during a game. However, 
his work is best known both for his quantitative results showing no difference 
between players of various strengths in the macrostructure of search (depth of 
search, number of nodes, branching factor, and so on) and also for his 
demonstration that level of chess skill dramatically affects the recall of 
positions shown for a short amount of time. 
 De Groot’s memory experiment, which set up the program for much later 
experimental work in the field, is simple. A chess position, taken from a master 
game unknown to the subjects, is presented to them for a short amount of time 
(De Groot varied the time from 2 to 15 s). The position is then removed from 
their sight, and subjects have to reconstruct it on a different board. The number 
of pieces correctly placed, or some similar measure, gives an index of subjects’ 
memory performance. De Groot’s results were dramatic: his grandmaster 
remembered the position almost perfectly after a presentation ranging from 2 to 
5 s (an average of 93% pieces correct), while his weakest subject, the 
equivalent of a class A player, barely got 50% correct.3  Moreover, protocols 
show that strong players grasp the meaning of the positions after a few seconds, 
understanding the main strategic features and literally seeing, if not the best 
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move, then at least a reasonably good move (De Groot, 1965, De Groot & 
Gobet, 1996). 
 According to De Groot, chess masters do not encode the position as isolated 
pieces, but as large, mostly dynamic “complexes.” These complexes are 
generally made of pieces but may sometimes incorporate some empty squares 
that play an important role in the position. Masters’ perception of a position as 
large units and their ability to rapidly zero in on the core of the position are 
made possible by the knowledge they have gathered during their study and 
practice of the game. De Groot has later shown (De Groot, 1966, De Groot & 
Jongman, 1966; De Groot & Gobet, 1996) that masters’ superiority is not 
provided by a general knowledge of first-order probabilities of piece locations 
on the board, but by a very specific type of knowledge that is actualized during 
the recognition of typical formations. 
 For De Groot, the necessary conditions to reach mastership include (a) a 
schooled and highly specific mode of perception, and (b) a system of methods 
stored in memory and rapidly accessible. Two types of knowledge are 
distinguished: knowledge (knowing that...) and intuitive experience (knowing 
how...). The first may be verbalized, but not the second. De Groot was mainly 
interested in the content of these types of knowledge and did not go into the 
question of how they are implemented in human memory. 
 Chase and Simon (1973b) re-investigated De Groot’s (1946/1965) recall 
experiment, adding both methodological and theoretical contributions. 
Studying the latencies between the placement of pieces during a copy and a 
recall task, they found that their master recalled bigger chunks (Miller, 1956), 
as well as more chunks. As an explanation of their master’s performance, they 
proposed that he had stored a large number of patterns in long-term memory 
(LTM), such as typical pawn castle formation, pawn chains, common 
constellations on the first rank, and typical attacking configurations. A 
statistical analysis showed that more than half of these constellations are pawn 
structures, which constitute a relatively stable feature of the position. 
 Simon and Gilmartin (1973) described a computer model (MAPP) that 
implemented a subset of the chunking theory and simulated the memory 
processes of chess players. MAPP combined elements of PERCEIVER (Simon 
& Barenfeld, 1969) and of EPAM. As illustrated by Figure 2, the model 
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proposed that a discrimination net functions as an LTM index which allows the 
identification of piece configurations, and that chess players, once a 
configuration has been identified, place a pointer to it into short-term memory 
(STM). MAPP implemented STM as encoding a set of patterns without 
semantic or ordered relation to each other. In essence, this model proposed that 
masters’ skill is based on their stock of configurations in LTM, which allows 
them, during a memory task, to recognize known patterns. An important aspect 
of the model was that the same cognitive limitations (e.g., STM capacity, 
encoding rate into LTM) apply in chess memory as in other cognitive domains. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
 When used as a simulated subject, MAPP produced results that were 
quantitatively inferior to masters’ results, but superior to class A players’ 
results. Qualitatively, MAPP placed the same groups of pieces as human 
players. Extrapolating from these results, Simon and Gilmartin (1973) 
estimated that grandmasters’ results may be explained by a repertoire ranging 
from 10,000 to 100,000 configurations stored in LTM (the estimate of 50,000 
is often found in the literature). Simon and Chase (1973) noted that a similar 
number of words belong to the vocabulary of a competent English speaker, and 
that such a quantity of patterns requires at least ten years of learning. 
 Continuing their theoretical investigation, Chase and Simon (1973b) 
proposed the model of the “mind’s eye,” which extends the chunking theory to 
account for problem-solving behavior. Chunks are represented in LTM by an 
internal name associated with a set of instructions that permit the patterns to be 
reconstituted as an internal image in the mind’s eye. The mind’s eye consists of 
a system that stores perceptual structures, both from external inputs and from 
memory stores, and that can be subjected to visuo-spatial mental operations. It 
contains relational structures, and new information can be abstracted from it. 
 The mind’s-eye model acts as a production system (Newell & Simon, 1972): 
chunks are automatically activated by the constellations on the external 
chessboard and trigger potential moves that will then be placed in STM for 
further examination. The choice of a move, then, depends both on a selective 
search in the space of the legal possibilities and on pattern recognition. 
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 Although Chase and Simon’s approach shares some features with De 
Groot’s—in particular the stress on perceptual processes—some differences 
need to be noted. Chase and Simon view perception as a passive process, while 
De Groot emphasizes the dynamic component of it. For him, perception is 
problem solving (De Groot & Gobet, 1996). 
The SEEK Theory 
Several knowledge-based explanations have been proposed to remedy the 
(sometimes presumed) weaknesses of the chunking theory. For example, it has 
been emphasized that masters recall a corrected version of a prototype 
(Hartston & Wason 1983), re-categorize chunks in order to achieve a global 
characterization of the position (Lories, 1984), access deeper semantic codes  
(e.g., Goldin, 1978; Lane & Robertson, 1979), or make use of high-level verbal 
knowledge (Cooke et al., 1993; Pfau & Murphy, 1988). But perhaps the most 
developed example of a knowledge-base theory for chess expertise—although 
many aspects of it are rather underspecified—is Holding’s (1985, 1992) SEEK 
(SEarch, Evaluation, Knowledge) theory. This choice is also apt because 
Holding explicitly rejects mechanisms similar to those proposed by the 
chunking theory.  
 SEEK proposes that three elements play a key role in chess expertise: search, 
evaluation, and knowledge. Masters play better than weaker players because 
they search more and better, because they evaluate the terminal positions in 
their search better, and because they know more. According to Holding, 
evaluation, and search to some extent, are made possible by the presence of an 
extensive knowledge base. The organization of this knowledge is more 
complex than proposed by the chunking theory, and allows experts to store the 
“gist” of a position, instead of its perceptual layout. Working memory is used 
in several ways in the theory: to store moves that have been explored, to 
remember the evaluation of a line, or to keep a trace of previous games that 
may be useful as guidelines. Holding  (1985, p. 251) specifically notes that 
chunk recognition is not necessary, since general characteristics of the positions 
may be used to generate the necessary knowledge. 
 SEEK explains masters’ outstanding recall of briefly-presented position by 
the greater familiarity they have with chess positions. This familiarity allows 
them  “to classify a new position as a set of interlocking common themes, or as 
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a set of deviations from prototype in long-term memory, while committing very 
little to rote memory” (Holding, 1985, p. 249). Holding also stressed that chess 
masters’ memories are rich and highly organized and that they are more general 
than specific, contrary to what is proposed by the chunking theory. The part of 
chess knowledge that is specific consists of the verbal encoding of sequences of 
moves. Finally, part of chess (meta)knowledge consists of principles for 
efficient search (for example, when to stop searching a line) and adequate 
evaluation. These principles are crucial in acquiring expertise, and most of 
them are encoded verbally. On one point Holding agrees with Chase and 
Simon, namely that a large amount of time and effort are necessary to acquire 
the skills of a chess master. 
 Although the SEEK theory has often been assumed to account for chess 
expertise in general and chess memory in particular, it has never been 
systematically subjected to empirical test. Moreover, its exposition is verbal, 
and its mechanisms (in particular with respect to memory phenomena) are not 
sufficiently detailed to allow the construction of a workable model. As will be 
seen later, it is often impossible to use SEEK without adding numerous ad hoc 
hypotheses. 
The Long-Term Working Memory Theory 
In the case of chess expertise, the LT-WM theory proposes that strong players 
use a retrieval structure representing the 64 squares of the board, which allows 
them to encode individual pieces and to represent a position as an integrated 
hierarchical structure (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Ericsson & Staszewski, 
1989). This structure, which both relates pieces to each other and associates 
pieces to their corresponding locations, allows a rapid encoding into LTM.  In 
addition to the retrieval structure, it is proposed that chess experts encode 
information by elaborating LTM schemas. (Figure 1 describes the application 
of LT-WM theory for serial stimuli. To visualize its application to chess, a bi-
dimensional domain, simply add a second dimension to the portion of the 
Figure depicting  the hierarchical organization of retrieval cues.) 
 As noted elsewhere (Gobet, 1997), the LT-WM theory is rather vague (e.g., 
what is the exact nature of the hierarchical retrieval structure?) and under-
specified (no time parameters are specified for encoding information into the 
retrieval structure and for elaborating LTM schemas). This allows for (at least) 
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two interpretations, depending on whether information encoding at higher 
levels of the retrieval structure is contingent upon encoding at lower levels. 
The square interpretation takes Ericsson’s and Kintsch (1995) description 
literally (e.g.: “If, on the one hand, chess experts had a retrieval structure 
corresponding to a mental chess board, they could store each piece at a time at 
the appropriate location within the retrieval structure.” p. 237; emphasis 
added), and assumes contingent encoding. It therefore states that most 
encoding relates to storing pieces in squares of the retrieval structure. The 
hierarchy interpretation assumes that encoding is not contingent and states that 
in preference to storing pieces in squares, experts store schemas and patterns in 
the various levels of the retrieval structure. This interpretation is compatible 
with Ericsson and Kintsch’s general presentation of their LT-WM theory, but is 
not specifically backed up by their discussion of chess expertise. 
 The chess memory evidence reviewed by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995, p. 
237-8) addresses mainly experiments with rather long presentation times, but it 
is assumed that the retrieval structure can also be used successfully with short 
presentation times, as in the standard five-second presentation of a game 
position (Ericsson & Staszewski, 1989). The square interpretation of the theory  
implies that chess differs from the other tasks discussed by Ericsson and 
Kintsch (1995) in that individual units of information (in the case of chess, 
pieces) are assumed to be encoded into the retrieval structures very fast, on the 
order of about 160 ms  (5 s divided by 32, since the retrieval structure can 
encode an entire position of 32 pieces), while all other experts discussed by 
Ericsson require at least one second to encode one unit of information (such as 
digits with the subject studied by Chase & Ericsson, 1982, or menu orders with 
the subject studied by Ericsson & Polson, 1988). The hierarchy interpretation 
(schemas and patterns are encoded) does not run into this problem, but has the 
disadvantage that the idea of retrieval structure loses its explanatory power to 
the benefit of a pattern-recognition based explanation—if large schemas can be 
recognized, then a limited STM would be sufficient.  
The Template Theory 
As will be shown later, Simon and Gilmartin’s MAPP, as well as other models 
of the EPAM family, was particularly strong in its ability to explain (chess) 
perception and memory at the chunk level, but weak in relating these chunks to 
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high-level descriptions. These high-level descriptions abound in masters’ 
retrospective protocols (see for example De Groot, 1946/1965; De Groot & 
Gobet, 1996) and may help explain how, upon recognition of a position, strong 
chess players rapidly access a network of knowledge allowing them to 
understand the subtleties of the position and to rapidly propose plausible moves 
and plans. Connecting low-level to high-level knowledge was an important 
motivation in developing the template theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996b) and was 
reached by combining the concept of chunk with that of retrieval structure. 
 The template theory is implemented as a computer program in the latest 
version of CHREST (Gobet, Richman & Simon, in preparation). Earlier 
versions of CHREST (Gobet, 1993a, 1993b) were developed to unify previous 
computer models of chess memory and perception (PERCEIVER, Simon and 
Barenfeld, 1969; MAPP, Simon and Gilmartin, 1973) with the idea of retrieval 
structure. An extension of the model embodies a production system that 
proposes moves after having recognized a pattern (Gobet & Jansen, 1994). 
 The perceptual part of the template theory remains basically the same as in 
MAPP: it is assumed that, when perceiving a chess board, chess players access 
chunks in LTM by filtering information through a discrimination net. Pointers 
to chunks in LTM are placed in STM,4 and rapidly-decaying visuo-spatial 
structures based on chunks are built up in the internal representation (cf. Chase 
& Simon’s mind’s eye). In the case of atypical positions, these chunks contain 
no more than the pieces that the system has recognized. In the case of typical 
positions, however, the discriminated node will give access to semantic 
memory, leading to information such as the opening the position may come 
from, the plans and moves to apply, and so on. This information is organized in 
a schematic form (Larkin & Simon, 1987). Two learning parameters are 
proposed: about 8 s to create a new node in the discrimination net, and about 1 
s to add information to an existing node. 
 For positions that subjects have studied or played extensively, it is proposed 
that chunks are developed into templates. Templates, which are specific to 
certain types of chess positions, contain at their core a large chunk. They also 
possess slots that may be filled in when viewing a position, in particular for 
features that are not stable in these types of positions. Slots, which may have 
default-values, contain information on the location of certain pieces, on 
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potential moves to play, or on semantic information like plans, tactical and 
strategic features, and so on. Slots are created as a function of the number of 
tests below a node in the discrimination net. When the same type of 
information (e.g., same type of piece or same square) is tested in several 
branches (the minimum number of occurrences is given by a parameter), a slot 
is created. 
 The theory proposes that chunks and templates are mainly accessed by visual 
information, although other routes to them exist, allowing a highly redundant 
memory management: chunks and templates may be accessed by contextual 
cues, by description of strategic or tactical features, by the moves leading to the 
position, by the name of the opening the position comes from, or by the names 
of players known to often employ such type of position. As is the case with 
chunks of pieces, these routes may be modeled as discrimination nets. This 
redundancy may be useful for difficult tasks. For example, during recall 
experiments, the use of verbal description—strong players spontaneously try to 
associate the position with the name of an opening—may complement visual 
encoding. Note also that the presence of templates makes STM a more dynamic 
store than in MAPP: when new chunks are perceived, the model tries both to 
incorporate this new information into the template (if any), and to get a richer 
template through further discrimination. 
 Like the chunking theory, the template theory is not limited to chess and 
claims that expertise is due to: (a) a large database of chunks, indexed by a 
discrimination net; (b) a large knowledge base, encoded as production and 
schemas; and (c) a coupling of the (perceptual) chunks in the index to the 
knowledge base. In addition, it proposes that some nodes evolve into more 
complex data structures (templates) and that nodes in the discrimination net 
may be accessed through several paths, thus adding redundancy to the system. 
Construction of networks having the characteristics mentioned under (a), (b) 
and (c) explains why expertise in knowledge-rich domains takes such a long 
time to develop: in addition to learning chunks, which was emphasized in 
Chase and Simon’s (1973b) and in Simon and Gilmartin’s (1973) papers, 
templates and productions have to be learned, as well as pointers linking them 
together and linking them to chunks. 
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Fit of the Theories to the Empirical Evidence 
Recent work on chess perception and memory is now discussed, focusing on 
data directly relevant to the comparison of the four theories. Data will be 
organized around the following themes: early perception, STM capacity and 
LTM encoding, modality of representation, LTM organization, and learning. 
The reader is invited to refer to Table 1, at the end of the paper, for a preview 
on how the data stack up for and against the various theories. (For a discussion 
of chess problem solving, see Gobet, 1997). 
Early Perception 
Evidence suggesting that players of various skill levels differ at an early stage 
of perception would provide confirming evidence for the chunking and 
template theories, which both incorporate detailed perceptual mechanisms. As 
will be argued later, this evidence could also suggest limitations of SEEK and 
of the LT-WM theory to explain chess expertise. 
 Studying eye movements, De Groot and Gobet (1996) show that there are 
clear skill differences in the way players look at a position: Masters’ fixations 
are shorter, show less variance, cover more of the board, and cover more 
important squares than novices’ fixations. In addition, as previously found by 
Charness and Reingold (1992) with presentation of only one quadrant of the 
board, masters fixate more often on the edges of the squares than the novices, 
which can be taken as evidence that they fixate groups of pieces instead of 
individual pieces.  
 Another crucial piece of evidence, likely to give indications on the 
automaticity of processes, is offered by subjects’ performance when 
presentation times are very short. Ellis (1973) found that chess memory and 
chess skill correlate even with presentation times as short as 150 ms. Ellis used 
4 x 4 square miniature chess boards and presented only common patterns of 
white pieces. His stronger subjects (class A players) were able to retain 6.7 
pieces out of 8, and his weaker subjects (class D and below), 4.5 pieces, on 
average. These results speak in favor of perceptual mechanisms independent of 
conscious control. Short presentation of entire boards yields similar results. For 
example, Gobet and Simon’s (1995) masters placed correctly about 70% of the 
pieces of a game position (a total of 26 pieces) after having seen the position 
for just one second and had close to 90% correct recall after a presentation of 
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two seconds. In addition, subjects sometimes recognize types of positions even 
with these short presentation times. 
 These results add support to the chunking and the template theories. Both 
predict that access to chunks and templates should be automatic, without 
recourse to any conscious process, and possible even with very short 
presentation times. In addition, a version of CHREST (De Groot and Gobet, 
1996) was able to simulate human eye movements in considerable detail.5  In 
addition to chunking mechanisms, the model implemented perceptual 
strategies, such as looking first at perceptually salient pieces. 
 Although the eye-movement studies fall outside the scope of the two other 
theories, the data on short presentation times have some important theoretical 
implications. With respect to SEEK, they indicate the need to explain how 
high-level knowledge is rapidly accessed through visual stimuli. They also 
show some inadequacies of the level-of-processing account, mentioned by 
Holding as a possible mechanism. It is doubtful that subjects process the visual 
stimuli at different “levels” with presentation times of one second or less. 
Hence, there are vast memory differences although players of different skill 
levels use the same level of processing.  
 With respect to the LT-WM theory, these results show important 
deficiencies in the square interpretation (that a structure similar to the chess 
board acts as a retrieval structure), because there is just not enough time in 
these experiments to encode information into this structure or to associate 
information with long-term schemas.  The hierarchy version of the theory, 
which assumes that chunks and not individual pieces are typically encoded into 
the retrieval structure, fares better, though there is a need for the theory to add 
an alternative, as yet unspecified, route to schemas that offer a faster access 
than the route offered by retrieval structure cues (see Figure 1). 
STM Capacity and LTM Encoding 
Interference Studies 
Empirical research has uncovered several weaknesses in the way Chase and 
Simon’s (1973b) theory handles STM and LTM storage. In the case of the 
classical chess memory recall setting (presentation of a position for 5 s), Chase 
and Simon’s theory clearly predicts that, since information is temporarily 
stored in STM and since the presentation time is not sufficient for LTM 
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encoding, storage of additional stimuli following a chess position should wipe 
it out from STM. However, this is hardly the case. The most compelling result 
was provided by Charness (1976), who used a variation of the Brown and 
Peterson paradigm (Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959). He inserted a 
delay of 30 s between the presentation and the recall of a chess position, with 
or without instructions to rehearse and either occupied or not by an interfering 
task.6  Following such interference, there was an increase in latency for the first 
piece to be reported, but the overall performance decreased only by 6 to 8%, 
little loss in comparison with experiments using the same technique with 
different material (nonsense trigrams). Interestingly, even interference due to 
chess material (such as finding the best move or naming the pieces in a 
different position) did not produce a significant degradation of performance.  
 Similar results were found by Frey and Adesman (1976), who used a 
different interfering task. Their subjects were confronted with two positions, 
presented in sequence for 8 s each, after which they had to count backward and 
aloud for 3 or 30 s. Finally, they had to reconstruct the first or the second 
position, without knowledge of which one was going to be chosen. Results 
indicated only a small loss of performance when compared with a control 
condition where only one board was presented. A logical extension of Frey and 
Adesman’s (1976) study of memory for either of two positions is to ask 
subjects to reconstruct both positions. This procedure has been extended up to 
five positions by Gobet and Simon (1996b), where boards were presented in 
short sequence for 5 s each, and up to nine positions by Cooke et al. (1993), 
who used a presentation time of 8 s. Both teams found that, although there is a 
decrease in the percentage of pieces recalled correctly, the number of pieces 
recalled increased as a function of the number of boards presented. In general, 
the limit in the number of boards to be recalled with some level of accuracy 
(say, 60%) seems to be around four or five. There are two exceptions: first, one 
subject in the Cooke et al. study (1993, p. 342) who (partially) recalled seven 
boards out of nine and who may have used a mnemonic technique based on 
associations with names of famous players to enhance his memory; and second, 
the subject trained by Gobet and Simon (1996b) to apply a similar mnemonic 
technique, who could recall, with higher than 70% average accuracy, up to 9 
positions presented for 8 s each, replacing as many as 160 pieces correctly. 
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 At first blush, these results seem squarely to refute Chase and Simon’s 
theory. However, a noticeable result of Gobet and Simon’s (1996b) study was 
that, when Chase and Simon’s 2 s boundary technique was used to estimate 
chunk size, large chunks were found for masters (up to 15 pieces). This result 
contrasts with the relatively small chunks found in the original study (see 
Gobet & Simon, in press, for potential explanations of this difference). If chunk 
size is larger than that proposed by Chase and Simon, then their model can 
account for the interference and multiple board data, assuming that subjects use 
the strategy of keeping at least the largest chunk for each position in STM. 
Supposing that masters are able to recognize such large chunks would, 
however, seriously inflate the estimated number of chunks in LTM: since the 
likelihood of recognizing such a chunk is low, only a huge chunk database 
could account for these recognitions. An alternative theoretical line is taken by 
the template theory, which avoids this inflation in chunk number by assuming 
that information can be  encoded into template slots rapidly, in less than 1 s. 
The presence of templates explains why the multiple board task is tractable for 
masters, at least for up to four or five boards: only one template per position 
needs to be memorized (either by storing it STM or by encoding additional 
information in LTM, such as episodic cues) in order to remember the “gist” 
of each position. Simulations of the CHREST implementation of the template 
theory show that this explanation fits the data well (Gobet et al., in 
preparation). The model relies on STM storage and, given a sufficiently long 
time to create a new node in LTM (about 8 s) or to add information to an 
existing node (about 1 s), on LTM storage. The U-curve found by Gobet and 
Simon (1996a), with the first and last positions being recalled best, support 
the view that both LTM and STM storage are important in this task.  
However, the model does not implement (yet) the idea that templates, which 
are in fact an organized part of semantic LTM, receive some activation when 
they are accessed. This may explain how players, both in the multiple board 
experiment and in Charness’ (1976) interference experiment, may still access 
information when it seems to have disappeared from STM.7 The idea of LTM 
activation has been recently implemented within the EPAM architecture by  
Richman, Staszewski and Simon (1995). 
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 SEEK offers two explanations to account for the interference data. The first 
explanation is Frey and Adesman’s (1976) and Charness’ (1976) depth of 
processing account, which proposes that, with experts, traces undergo a deep 
treatment that protects them against retroactive interference. The second 
explanation is similar to that of Cooke et al. (1994), who propose that players 
encode one high-level description per position. In both cases, no specific 
mechanisms are proposed, which makes it difficult to evaluate these proposals. 
Note that the explanation based on high-level descriptions can be subsumed as 
a special case of the template theory, where templates provide players with  
labels for characterizing positions.  
 Both versions of the LT-WM theory account for the (non-chess) interference 
results by assuming that strong players encode each position rapidly into the 
retrieval structure. This explanation does not work, however, with chess 
interfering material, such as in the multiple board experiment, because the 
theory specifically states that chess experts have a single retrieval structure 
(Ericsson & Staszewski, 1989). The second encoding mechanism provided by 
the theory, elaboration of LTM schemas and patterns, may be used to account 
for the data. If so, several aspects of the theory are not worked out in sufficient 
detail: What are the time parameters in the elaboration process? Are the 
elaborations subject to interference or decay? Why is there a limit of around 5 
boards for most subjects? (As suggested by a reviewer, a possible answer to 
the last question is that there is a form of fan effect in LTM.) 
Random Positions 
Experiments on the recall of random positions are theoretically interesting, 
because the four theories make different predictions: the chunking and template 
theories predict a small advantage for experts, as experts are more likely to find 
chunks even in random positions; SEEK predicts no superiority for experts, as 
no prototype can be found with these stimuli; and the LT-WM predicts a strong 
superiority for experts, because they can use the retrieval structure and/or create 
new LTM associations to encode pieces.8  Experiments with short presentation 
times are discussed in this section; those with long presentation times are 
discussed in the section on short-range learning. 
 With a presentation time of 5 s,  Chase and Simon (1973a) did not find any 
recall difference between their three subjects (a master, a class A player and a 
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beginner) with random positions. This result had a dramatic impact in cognitive 
psychology and is a classic result found in most cognitive psychology 
textbooks. However, matters are more complicated. Gobet and Simon (1996a), 
reviewing a dozen experiments where random positions were used with a 
presentation time less or equal to 10 s, recently showed that there is a 
correlation between skill level and recall performance even with random 
positions, although it is rarely statistically significant. The lack of significance 
may be explained by the lack of power of most experiments reviewed: the 
sample size is small, as is the effect size (when confronted with random 
positions for 5 s, masters place an average of 5.5 pieces, while the weakest 
players—below class B—place an average of 2.6 pieces). 
  Thus, strong players do maintain some superiority when recalling briefly 
presented random positions. As discussed by Gobet and Simon (1996a), this is 
what is predicted both by the chunking and the template models: a large 
database of chunks is more likely to recognize chunks serendipitously in a 
random position than a small one. Simulations described in Gobet and Simon 
(1996c) show that larger nets do indeed perform better at recalling random 
positions than smaller nets. Holding (1985) proposes that familiarity with chess 
positions plays a key role in chess players’ memory, but it is unclear how 
SEEK’s two main “mechanisms” implementing familiarity can account for the 
skill effect in the recall of random positions. On the one hand,  high-level 
descriptions (or prototypes) are useless, because random positions, by 
construction, do not map to such high-level descriptions. On the other hand, the 
level-of-processing approach is at a loss with this result, since subjects of 
various skill levels seem to pay attention to the same aspects of the position, as 
indicated by their verbal protocols (Gobet, 1993a).  
 Finally, the square version of the LT-WM theory, which suggests that each 
slot in the 64-square retrieval structure allows a rapid encoding into LTM, does 
indeed predict an effect of skill for random positions, but an effect that is much 
stronger than is actually found. As mentioned above, even masters recall only 
an average of 5.5 pieces with a presentation of 5 s. The hierarchy version does 
not suffer from the same problem, as recall is contingent on the recognition of 
schemas or patterns. This version, which accounts for the data on both game 
and random positions recall, offers then an explanation similar to that of the 
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chunking theory, though it does not offer clear mechanisms on how schemas 
and patterns are accessed. Note also that the two key mechanisms in the LT-
WM theory—use of a retrieval structure and elaboration encoding through 
LTM schemas—do not play any role in this explanation. At worst, if encoding 
times are rapid with both mechanisms, as postulated by the theory, they would 
lead to a recall performance that is superior to human experts. 
Number of Pieces 
Chase and Simon (1973a) found that, presentation times being equal, their 
subjects (with the exception of the beginner) retained more pieces in middle 
game positions (average number of pieces = 25) than in endgame positions, 
where few pieces are typically left (average number of pieces = 13). As their 
strongest subject, a master, recalled about 8 pieces in endgame positions, the 
hypothesis of a ceiling effect may be ruled out. Saariluoma (1984, exp. 3) 
replicated this result, presenting positions containing 5, 15, 20 and 25 pieces. 
 Referring to the chunking theory, Saariluoma (1984) proposed that strong 
players recognize various known constellations in positions containing 
numerous pieces (opening and middle game positions), but that the endgame 
positions are less predictable and, therefore, harder to code as chunks. A 
similar explanation may be given by the template theory and, to some extent, 
by SEEK. For example, it can be pointed out that, since the chess game tree 
expands exponentially, endgame positions are less likely to belong to a known 
category (see De Groot & Gobet, 1996, for an in-depth discussion of the 
properties of the chess game-tree). However, the fact that even masters cannot 
recall all pieces of an endgame position seems rather damaging for the square 
version of the LT-WM theory, which predicts a perfect recall, because few 
pieces, sharing many semantic relations (the positions are taken from master 
games) need to be encoded into the retrieval structure. The hierarchy version of 
the LT-WM theory can use Saariluoma’s explanation, with the qualification 
that the  encoding times into the retrieval structure and the LTM elaboration 
times have to be slow to avoid too high a recall percentage. 
Recall of Games 
The recall task has also been applied to sequences of moves. Chase and Simon 
(1973b) found a correlation between recall scores and skill, even for random 
move sequences. They also found that all players were slower to reproduce 
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random moves. According to them, strong players’ superiority for random 
move sequences may be explained by the relatively long time of exposure 
(about 2 minutes in total). Such an interval may allow numerous 
reorganizations in the material and a permanent storage into LTM. Finally, 
analysis of the reproduction errors and pauses of their subjects suggests a 
hierarchical organization of moves, each episode being organized around a 
goal. 
 In an experiment using blindfold chess,9 Saariluoma (1991) dictated moves 
at a rapid pace (one piece moved every 2 s), from three types of games: one 
game actually played, one game where the moves were random but legal, and 
one game where the moves were random and possibly illegal. Results show that 
masters were able to indicate the piece locations almost perfectly after 15 
moves for the actual game and legal random games, but that the recall of 
random illegal games was less than 20%, close to, but still better than the 
performance of novices, who were outperformed in the two other conditions.  
 The explanation of the chunking theory for actual games was mentioned 
earlier: the rather long presentation time of these experiments allows subjects 
to store information in LTM, such as creating new links in semantic memory or 
learning new chunks. In addition, the template theory also proposes that moves 
and sequences of moves may be chunked, with strong players having stored 
more and longer sequences of moves, and that the presence of templates makes 
storage easier for stronger players. Finally, the two theories can also use 
Saariluoma's (1991) following explanation. With random legal games, strong 
players, as they have more chunks with which they can associate information 
about moves (remember that the presentation time is long), are more likely to 
find such chunks even after random moves. With random illegal games, 
however, chunks become harder and harder to find, and masters’ performance 
drops. Random legal games drift only slowly into positions where few chunks 
can be recognized, and, therefore, allow for a relatively good recall. The further 
away from the starting position, the harder recall should be, which is what is 
observed (the recall with legal random games drops to 60% after 25 moves, 
while the recall of actual games stays close to 90%). Random illegal games 
move more rapidly into chaotic positions, where few chunks may be recognized 
and recall is, therefore, low. 
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 SEEK explains performance with actual games by assuming that masters 
make use of prototypes, and also of compiled sequences of moves (Holding, 
1985). It is more difficult for SEEK to account for masters’ superiority in 
recalling random legal moves, because claiming that masters are more 
“familiar” with chess positions than non-masters only labels the phenomenon, 
but does not explain it. The type of knowledge proposed by SEEK—prototypes 
and generic knowledge—are not sufficient for explaining this result, as they are 
not available in positions arising both from legal and illegal random moves. 
Moreover, SEEK rejects the possibility of chunks, which, as we have seen, are 
crucial in explaining the difference between random legal and illegal games.  
 According to the two versions of the LT-WM theory, playing blindfold chess 
is made possible both by the retrieval structure, which allows players to rapidly 
update information about the position, and by the rapid elaboration of schemas 
in LTM. This explanation is consistent with masters’ performance with actual 
and random legal games, but not with random illegal games. In this case, 
masters’ low recall suggests that the retrieval structure is less powerful and the 
integration with LTM schemas slower than postulated by the theory. A solution 
is achieved by shifting the emphasis to recognition of LTM schemas, as is done 
in the hierarchical interpretation; however, this decreases the explanatory 
power of the retrieval structure and of LTM elaborations, which are central in 
Ericsson and Kintsch’s (1995) account. 
Modality of Representation 
The chunking theory and the template theory propose that the main access to 
chess chunks is visuo-spatial (though other routes, such as verbal, are present 
as well), and that the mind’s eye (internal representation), uses a visuo-spatial 
mode of representation. SEEK gives more importance to abstract and verbal 
types of representation. Finally, the LT-WM theory proposes a spatial mode of 
representation for the retrieval structure. 
 Chase and Simon (1973b) examined the role played by the type of 
presentation of the stimulus. Their goal was to eliminate the theoretical 
explanation that the chunk structures they had isolated were due to a 
reorganization during the output rather than to perceptual processes during 
encoding. They presented half of the positions with standard board and pieces, 
and the other half with grids containing letters. During recall, the same 
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dichotomy was used. Response modality did not influence the percentage of 
correct answers, but a large difference was observed with the stimulus 
modality, their class A player obtaining about twice as many correct pieces 
with board presentation than with letter diagrams. Interestingly, this difference 
disappeared rapidly with practice: after about one hour of practice, their subject 
did not show differential results between boards and letter diagrams. In another 
experiment, class A players did not exhibit any difference in the recall of 
positions shown with diagrams (such as the ones found in chess journals or 
books) and positions with standard pieces and board. The beginner was very 
sensitive to these modality differences. 
 Brooks (1967) found that, when sentences referred to spatial representation, 
it was better to listen to them than to read them. Using this background, 
Charness (1974, study no 5) tested the hypothesis that statements describing a 
chess position were represented with a spatial structure. His results indicated 
that chess players obtained a better retention level when they listened to the 
description of a position10 than when they read it, whereas no difference was to 
be found with non-players. Moreover, an imagery scale showed a clear 
visualization decrease in the reading condition. Finally, Charness (1974, study 
no 7) found that positions presented visually were better recalled (about 18%) 
than positions presented auditorily. 
 Using Baddeley’s (1986) concurrent memory load paradigm, Robbins et al. 
(1995) studied the effect of interfering conditions during the presentation of 
chess positions. They found that a verbal task had only a minimal effect on 
performance, while a visuo-spatial task and a task aimed at suppressing the 
central executive caused a significant loss of performance (more than 2/3 in 
comparison with the control task). Interestingly, these authors observed similar 
effects on a chess problem solving task, with the qualification that performance 
does not decrease as drastically (only 1/3). Some of these results—effect of 
visuo-spatial interference and absence of effect of articulatory interference—
have also been found by Saariluoma (1992). Combining the concurrent 
memory load paradigm with blindfold play, Saariluoma (1991) dictated 
sequences of moves from games at a rate of 2 s per piece moved and asked 
subjects to describe the location of all pieces after 15 and 25 moves. He found 
that concurrent interfering tasks had a deleterious effect when they were visual 
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or related to the central executive, but not when they were simply articulatory. 
These three tasks had no effect when given as posterior interference tasks.11 
 Finally, masters’ reports on the way they play blindfold chess have shed light 
on the type of representation used. Upon the analysis of the questionnaires he 
had sent to the best players of the time, Binet (1894) concluded that knowledge, 
more than visual images, played an essential role in blindfold chess, a role 
confirmed by subsequent research. In his description of (simultaneous) 
blindfold chess, former world champion Alekhine stresses the importance of 
logical rather than visual memory (Bushke, 1971). Fine (1965), another world 
class player, emphasized the importance of chess knowledge, which allows the 
expert player to grasp the position as an organized whole, and the capacity to 
visualize the board clearly. In an extensive review of the literature on blindfold 
chess, Dextreit and Engel (1981) note that positions are encoded as key-
sentences (e.g., “Panov attack: White builds up an attack on the King’s side, 
Black tries to counter-attack on the center”), corresponding to the critical 
moments of the game. I will take up the role of high-level representation in the 
section on conceptual knowledge. 
 In conclusion, there is very strong evidence that chessplayers use a visuo-
spatial mode of representation, as proposed by both the chunking and the 
template theories. This visuo-spatial mode does not imply, pace Ericsson and 
Kintsch (1995, p. 237), that the chunking theory predicts difficulties in 
encoding the type of verbal, serial inputs used by Saariluoma. Information on 
the location of single pieces may be stored in the mind’s eye for a brief period 
of time, and chunks recognized by scanning part of it. In addition, the relatively 
long time used for dictating pieces may be used to create a few new chunks. 
The template theory specifically states that several routes (visual, verbal, or 
conceptual) may lead to the same LTM node, which may in turn yield the same 
visuo-spatial representation in the mind’s eye.  
 According to SEEK, a large part of chessplayers’ memory is encoded 
verbally. Empirical data (Charness, 1974; Robbins et al., 1995; Saariluoma, 
1992) clearly refute this claim, and show that visuo-spatial encoding plays a 
much more important role. SEEK has little to say about the sorts of recoding 
present in Chase and Simon’s (1973b) and Saariluoma’s (1991) experiments. 
Finally, LT-WM’s emphasis on a spatial mode of representation for the 
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retrieval structure is corroborated by the empirical data. In addition, the theory 
accounts for chess masters’ ability to recode verbal input into a visuo-spatial 
representation through the storage capacity provided by the retrieval structure.    
LTM Organization 
This section presents empirical evidence for chunks, for conceptual 
organization of knowledge, and for the presence of a retrieval structure. 
Direct Evidence for Chunks 
The chunking and template theories make strong predictions on the structure of 
chunks.  According to both theories, pairs of pieces that have numerous 
relations are more likely to be noticed together, and therefore chunked. Chase 
and Simon (1973a)  analyzed the chess relations (attack, defense, proximity, 
same color and same type) between successively placed pieces in different 
tasks (a recall and a copy task) and in different types of positions (game and 
random), and found that the probabilities of these relations between successive 
pieces belonging to a chunk (less than 2 seconds’ interval) are much greater 
than the probabilities between successive pieces not belonging to a chunk (an 
interval of more than 2 seconds). The basic analyses leading to chunk 
identification by Chase and Simon (1973a) have been recently replicated by 
Gobet and Simon (in press), who also provide new analyses supporting the 
chunking hypothesis.  
 Experiments using different techniques offer converging evidence that 
supports the psychological reality of chunks as defined either by numbers of 
chess relations or latency in placement. It has been shown that pieces presented 
at a rapid rate (about 2 s per piece) are better retained when they are presented 
according to the chunk relations proposed by Chase and Simon (1973a) than 
when they are presented by columns or randomly; this result holds for both 
verbal and visual presentation (Charness, 1974; Frey and Adesman 1976). 
Interestingly, chunk presentation yielded better recall than presentation of the 
entire position for the same total time (Frey & Adesman 1976). 
 The partitioning technique devised by Reitman (1976) for studying GO 
players’ memory has also offered supporting evidence for a LTM organization 
based on chunks. Chi (1978) showed that chunks were sometimes overlapping, 
which was also found in computer simulations using the chunking approach 
(De Groot & Gobet, 1996). Second, she found that the amount of time taken to 
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place pieces crossing a chunk boundary (as defined by the way subjects 
partitioned the board after recall) was on average longer (about 3 s) than the 
amount of time taken to place pieces within a chunk (around 1.5 s). A 
partitioning procedure was also used by Freyhoff, Gruber and Ziegler (1992), 
with the addition that subjects were required both to divide the groups obtained 
in a first partition into subgroups and to combine the original groups into 
supergroups. At all levels of partitioning, masters selected larger clusters of 
pieces than class B players did. In addition, the chunks they detected at the 
basic level corresponded to the chunks identified by Chase and Simon (1973a), 
both with respect to size and with respect to the pattern of relations between 
pieces. 
 Gold and Opwis (1992) used hierarchical cluster analysis to analyze chess 
players’ chunk structures. The clusters they identified with this technique were 
similar to those identified by latencies (e.g., castle positions, chain of pawns, 
common back-rank piece positions). Using a sorting task, Gruber and Ziegler 
(1990) found that chess players used sorting units similar to the chunks 
identified by Chase and Simon (1973a, 1973b). However, such chunks were 
less frequent with stronger players, who tended to use overlapping sorting 
criteria that grouped chunks together. Consistent evidence was found by Gruber 
(1991), who showed that, in a task consisting of guessing a position (see also 
Jongman, 1968; De Groot & Gobet, 1996), weak players asked questions about 
the location of single pieces, while experts asked questions about the past and 
future proceedings of the game, about plans and evaluations, and so on. 
 Taken together, these results support the concept of chunks and the estimate 
that it takes at least two seconds to access a new chunk and less than two 
seconds for retrieval within a chunk. However, they also indicate that strong 
players use higher-level types of descriptions. As discussed in the section on 
conceptual knowledge, the latter fact is accounted for by the template theory, 
but not by the chunking theory. 
 It is unclear how SEEK accounts for the results reviewed in this section, 
which offer strong support for the existence of chunks, which Holding (1985, 
1992) explicitly denies. With respect to the square version of the LT-WM 
theory, additional assumptions (such as strategies during recall) are needed to 
account for the presence of chunks, since pieces may be retrieved from the 
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retrieval structure in an arbitrary order (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). The 
hierarchy version may account for this section results by making additional 
assumptions about the way patterns and schemas are organized in LTM. In 
principle, the same learning mechanisms provided by the chunking and the 
template theories could be incorporated into the LT-WM theory. 
Number of Chunks in LTM 
This section offers one of the rare instances where the predictions of different 
theories (SEEK vs. the chunking theory) have been directly tested 
experimentally. Commenting on Simon and Gilmartin’s (1973) estimate that 
the number of chunks necessary to reach expertise was about 50,000, Holding 
(1985, 1992) proposed that this number could be decreased to about 2,500 if 
we are willing to assume that patterns are encoded independently of color and 
of location, that is, more abstractly. For example, a pattern shifted horizontally 
and/or vertically by several squares would be encoded by the same chunk in 
LTM because the functional relations among the pieces are maintained. 
 Gobet and Simon (1996c) tested Holding’s claim by using positions that had 
been modified according to various mirror-image reflections (e.g., White and 
Black, or left and right are swapped). Their hypothesis, based on the chunking 
and template theories, was that recall of non-modified positions should be 
better than recall of modified positions, as the former should elicit the 
recognition of more chunks than the latter. By contrast, a generic encoding, as 
proposed in SEEK, predicts no difference between the conditions. Gobet and 
Simon found that recall was slightly, but statistically significantly, impaired by 
such distortions. Converging evidence on the importance of location in 
encoding chess knowledge is provided by Saariluoma (1994), who distorted 
positions by swapping two of their quadrants, and found that the recall of the 
translated pieces was dramatically reduced in comparison with that of unmoved 
pieces. 
 Taken together, these results suggest that spatial location is encoded in 
chunks and add plausibility to Simon and Gilmartin’s estimate of the number 
of chunks necessary for expertise. Gobet and Simon (1996c) report simulations 
with a simplified chunking model that showed the same effects as human 
subjects in the mirror-image modification experiments. SEEK could account 
for these results by pointing out that LTM schemas or prototypes are harder to 
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access with the modified positions. (However, SEEK would have a harder time 
with another experiment reported by Saariluoma, 1994, who constructed 
positions by taking quadrants from four different positions; players had a recall 
performance close to game positions, although construction of the positions 
made access to LTM schemas difficult.)  It is unclear how the square version of 
LT-WM accounts for the results reported in this section. Every “square” in the 
retrieval structure has the same encoding power, hence the LT-WM prediction 
is that modified positions should be recalled as well as unmodified positions. A 
possible explanation, based on the assumption that the retrieval structure 
encodes relations between pieces as well as their location, does not help: the 
mirror-image positions contain the same set of relations between the pieces as 
the original game positions, with the qualification that the direction of relations 
is modified. As for the hierarchical version of the LT-WM theory, it may 
account for the results with the additional assumptions that location is encoded 
in chess patterns, and that the time to encode patterns in the higher levels of the 
hierarchical retrieval structure and pieces on squares is not fast (else, the same 
difficulty as with the square version would arise). 
Direct evidence for conceptual knowledge 
The chunking theory emphasizes the role of perceptual aspects of chess 
memory, which does not mean, however, that it denies the importance of 
conceptual knowledge (cf. Chase & Simon, 1973b, p. 260). The template 
theory specifies conceptual knowledge in detail, with templates acting as 
conceptual prototypes. SEEK clearly emphasizes the role of conceptual 
representation, by its assumption that chess players’ knowledge is stored at a 
higher level than the chunks proposed by the chunking theory. Finally, the LT-
WM theory suggests ways in which connections may occur between the 
retrieval structure and the conceptual information held in LTM, although these 
suggestions are not worked out in detail.  
 All four theories, therefore, agree about the role of conceptual knowledge, so 
the data presented in this section are not expected to discriminate strongly 
between them, as was the case with the data about random positions, where it is 
not possible to use conceptual knowledge. It is, however, important to review 
evidence related to this topic, for two reasons. First, these data are often 
incorrectly used as negative evidence against the chunking theory. Second, they 
 32
illustrate the strong differences that exist in the level of precision with which 
these theories are specified.  
 Several authors have shown that the presence of supplementary information 
on the position, even of an abstract kind, enhanced subjects’ performance. 
Goldin (1978) obtained such results by having her subjects study the previous 
moves of the game. She found, on the one hand, that stereotyped, highly typical 
positions were better recalled by all subjects and on the other hand, that 
previous study of the game significantly increased the correctness of the 
responses as well as the confidence that subjects placed in them. Frey and 
Adesman (1976, exp. 1) observed similar results when presenting the moves 
leading to the position to be remembered. It should, however, be noticed that in 
both Goldin’s and Frey and Adesman’s experiments, the level-of-processing 
variable is confounded with the presentation time variable. 
 Varying the instructions given to their subjects, Lane and Robertson (1979) 
observed that recall performance varied as a function of the level of semantic 
significance with which subjects could examine the position. At all skill levels, 
players who had only a structural task to perform (to count the number of 
pieces located on white and black squares) obtained worse results than the ones 
asked to judge the position and try to find the best move. This difference 
disappeared, however, when subjects were notified in advance that they would 
have to reconstruct the position. Manipulating the levels of processing yields 
the same types of effect with recognition tasks (Goldin, 1978). Note, however, 
that recognition performance is high even with superficial tasks (more than 
70% for class A players).  
 The importance of high-level representation has also been established 
experimentally by the analysis of protocols from problem solving (De Groot, 
1946/1965) and recall tasks (De Groot, 1946/1965, Gobet, 1993a), as well as in 
a classification task (Freyhoff, Gruber and Ziegler, 1992). In particular, Cooke 
et al. (1993) showed that players took better advantage of a high-level 
description of a position when the description was given before rather than 
after the presentation of the position itself. Finally, there is strong evidence for 
a hierarchical representation of chess positions in memory (De Groot & Gobet, 
1996;  Freyhoff et al., 1992; Jongman, 1968).  
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 As mentioned earlier, the experiments on semantic orientation have often 
been cited as negative evidence against the chunking theory (e.g., Cooke et al., 
1993; Holding, 1985), though it is not clear why this is so. According to the 
chunking theory, instructing subjects to pay attention to different aspects of the 
stimuli will determine what kind of chunks will be placed in STM. While it is 
true that MAPP (Simon & Gilmartin, 1973) simulated only perceptual intake of 
chess positions, there is nothing in the theory that precludes other access to 
chunks. The template theory makes this point explicit by emphasizing that 
several discrimination routes may lead to the same chunk.  
 It is true, however, that high-level representations are not mentioned 
explicitly in the chunking theory, which focuses on low-level representations. 
The template theory removes this weakness by offering a mechanism on how 
chunks evolve into more complex and higher-level structures. The theory also 
predicts that giving a high-level description before the presentation of a 
position enhances recall more than when it is given after (cf. Cooke et al., 
1993): in the former case, but not in the latter, subjects rapidly access a 
template—it is strongly suggested by the experimenter!—and then have time 
either to encode smaller chunks or individual pieces in STM or to fill in 
information into the template slots. 
 Clearly, the experiments related to level of processing (Goldin, 1978; Lane 
& Robertson, 1979) support SEEK, which makes use of the prototype and 
level-of-processing accounts of chess memory. SEEK also offers an 
explanation, based on the idea of prototypes, for the high-level representations 
used by chess masters. However, it does not give details on how these 
prototypes are created. Finally, both versions of the LT-WM theory specify that 
the presence of LTM schemas explains the facilitating role of conceptual 
information or processing and accounts for experts’ use of high-level 
representations. As with SEEK, however, there is no explanation of how these 
schemas are developed.  
Direct Evidence for Retrieval Structures 
The strongest evidence for the kind of retrieval structure advocated by the LT-
WM theory is offered by Ericsson and Oliver (1984), cited by Ericsson and 
Staszewski (1989), who were interested in the speed with which chess experts 
can access information in the “internal chess board.” They asked their single 
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subject, an Expert, to memorize a 40-move game. During the test phase, he was 
presented with the notation of a square, say “d4,” and was asked to name the 
piece located on this square, if any, as fast as possible. The entire board was 
probed in a random way. The subject took only two seconds to make a move in 
the blindfold condition. Such a speed of encoding did not spoil his accuracy in 
answering the probes (over 95% correct). The average latency to answer the 
probe was around 2 s in the blindfold position and around 1 s when he could 
see the board. 
 In another experiment, their subject had to memorize two positions, 
presented visually in diagrams. He was then probed following one of three 
presentation orders: (a) in the sequential condition, all squares of one position 
were probed, and then the squares of the other position; (b) in the alternating 
condition, each position was alternatively probed; (c) in the last condition, 
squares were randomly selected from either position. After a few trials where 
results among the three conditions were indistinguishable, a clear pattern 
emerged: the random and alternate conditions remained close (2.4 s and 1.9 s 
per probe, on average), while the sequential condition’s probe became almost 
twice as fast (about 1.0 s). The random condition showed no reliable speed-up 
with practice, the alternate a slight one, and the sequential an important one. In 
the sequential condition a peak appears when the first square of the second 
board is probed (about 1.4 s), after that the pace was as fast as in the first 
position. Finally, the random condition showed a speed up when the probes 
stayed in the same position. 
 Ericsson and Staszewski proposed that this subject used a common retrieval 
structure for the two positions, because he could access only one position at a 
time (cf. the increase of time when switching positions and the speed up when 
the position stayed the same). These results may, however, be as well 
accounted for by other explanations, among them: two retrieval structures (the 
increased latency would be caused by the switch of the 2 structures), 
hierarchical organization of chunks (the increased latency would be caused by 
accessing another supergroup of chunks), or two templates. Possibly, chunks 
and templates could be “unpacked” in a rapidly decaying internal 
representation, allowing a fast access to them. (SEEK could offer a similar 
explanation by using the concept of prototypes instead of chunks or templates.) 
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Unfortunately, Ericsson and Oliver’s subject was not tested with random 
positions, which would have enabled us to rule out some of these alternative 
hypotheses. 
 While undoubtedly interesting, this piece of research needs replication, 
because the only subject studied may not be representative of most chess 
players of his strength. (Ericsson and Staszewski note that the difference 
between his play in normal and blindfold conditions was small, whereas most 
players’ strength shows a more important discrepancy in these two variants of 
chess.) 
Learning 
The empirical data on chess learning may be classified into two different 
categories: short-range learning (in the order of tens of seconds) and long-range 
learning (in the order of years). The chunking and the template theories use the 
same parameters as the EPAM theory (Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984), hence it is 
easy for these theories to make quantitative predictions. As mentioned above, 
the key parameter here is that it takes about 8 s to create a chunk, and about 1 s 
to add information to an existing chunk (Simon, 1976). SEEK proposes that 
learning consists of creating prototypes and acquiring general principles but 
does not offer either precise mechanisms or quantitative predictions. Finally, 
the LT-WM theory implies that learning consists of creating the retrieval 
structure, of speeding up encoding and retrieval mechanisms, and of 
augmenting schematic LTM. No time parameters are offered by the theory, 
hence it is not possible to make quantitative predictions. 
Short-Range Learning 
According to Chase and Simon (1973b), patterns stored in LTM are not equally 
familiar. This observation led them to propose that a dual mechanism operates 
during the perception of a position: at the beginning, familiar chunks are 
perceived; then, attention is focused on less familiar chunks or even on isolated 
pieces, which may be learnt. A consequence of this dual encoding and of the 
fact that the same pieces may belong to several chunks is that the probability of 
encoding a chunk is high at the early stage of perception and the probability of 
encoding isolated pieces (or of encoding chunks overlapping with others) is 
high in the later stages. Thus, the quantity of information intake diminishes as 
the presentation time increases.  
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 With game positions, Charness (1981b), using presentation times ranging 
from 1 to 4 s, and Saariluoma (1984), using times from 1 s to 12 s, provided 
results compatible with this hypothesis. The most complete set of data was 
supplied by Gobet and Simon (1995), whose players ranged from weak 
amateurs to professional grandmasters. They systematically varied the 
presentation time from 1 second to 60 seconds and found that an exponential 
growth function fits the data well (r2 > .90).12 Both parameters of this function 
(B and c) varied as a function of skill: compared with weaker players, stronger 
players memorized more with a presentation time of one second and took better 
advantage of longer presentation times to improve their score. Using Chase and 
Simon’s theoretical framework, it is unclear whether this second advantage is 
due to the fact that strong players learn new chunks faster or whether it is due 
to the fact that they recognize more chunks with additional time. As shown 
next, this relation between skill level and the parameters B and c remains when 
random positions are used. 
 Early results about the effect of presentation time on random positions were 
difficult to interpret. On the one hand, Djakow et al. (1927) and Lories (1987) 
found a skill effect with a presentation of one minute (but see Gobet, 1993a, for 
methodological limitations of these studies). On the other hand, Chase and 
Simon’s (1973a) master did not show superior progress over a class A player 
and a beginner in the learning of random positions. Gobet and Simon (1995) 
offered more systematic data, varying the presentation from 1 to 60 seconds. As 
with game positions, an exponential growth function provided an excellent fit 
to the data. The surprising result was that the data with random positions 
showed the same pattern as those with game positions, with the qualification 
that the percentage of recall was lower with the former positions: players of 
different skills varied both in the amount of information they were able to 
memorize after an exposure of one second and in the rate with which they used 
additional presentation time, the stronger players showing a slight superiority in 
both cases. As with game positions, it is unclear whether this difference in the 
use of additional time is due to recognizing more chunks or to learning new 
chunks. Note that the task is far from trivial even for masters: on average, with 
an one-minute exposure, they were able to replace correctly only about 17 out 
of 26 pieces (68%). 
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 Saariluoma (1989) provided some interesting results both in connection with 
the influence of meaningfulness on recall and the role of presentation time. His 
methodology was similar to that used in the study of extraordinary memory for 
digits and restaurant orders (Chase & Ericsson, 1982; Ericsson & Polson, 
1988). Positions were presented auditorily, one piece every 2 or 4 s 
(respectively 50 and 100 s for the entire position). An empty board was placed 
in front of the subjects. In accordance with Gobet and Simon’s (1995) data on 
the role of presentation time, results indicated that strong players were better in 
the recall of game as well as random positions, and that performance increased, 
for all players and types of positions, with the increase in latency between the 
presentation of two successive pieces. Results also showed that recall 
superiority for strong players remained when subjects had to memorize 4 game 
positions, but that players of all categories performed poorly with 4 random 
positions.   Both the chunking theory, given a discrimination net sufficiently 
big to contain large chunks, and the template theory account for these results 
well (for game and random positions), with the assumption, already 
incorporated in the EPAM theory, that it takes about 8 seconds to create a 
chunk in LTM (see computer simulations reported in Gobet, 1996). As 
mentioned earlier, SEEK does not have much to say about the results on short-
range learning.  
 Given that no time parameters are indicated, it is difficult to judge the fit of 
the LT-WM theory to the data with game position. The results with random 
positions and long presentation times seem, however, to be negative evidence 
against the square version of the theory: even masters recall little in one 
minute. Pointing out that no LTM schema can be used to supply additional 
integration is not of much help, because the long presentation time should 
allow the retrieval structure itself to encode a sufficient number of retrieval 
cues to allow an almost perfect recall. As was the case with previous results, 
the hierarchical version could offer a reasonable account of the data, assuming 
that the encoding times into the retrieval structure and the LTM elaboration 
times are long enough, which seems however to contradict LT-WM emphasis 
on rapid encoding with experts. 
Long-Range Learning 
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As far as I know, there is only one longitudinal study about chess expertise. 
Charness (1989) has re-tested, with the same material, one subject, DH, who 
had participated nine years earlier in several chess experiments (Charness 
1981a, 1981b). During this period, DH improved his level from about 1,600 
ELO to a little more than 2,400, that is by four standard deviations. With 
respect to problem solving, it took less time for DH to choose a move, and he 
was exploring fewer different base moves (i.e., he was more selective) when 
tested nine years later. He was also faster to evaluate endgame positions and 
slightly more accurate. The size of his tree search did not vary much (if 
anything, is was smaller on the re-test), nor his maximum depth of search. In 
the recall task, DH was close to perfect in the first testing session, and perfect 
nine years later. Chunks were larger and less numerous, and the between-
chunks latencies were smaller in the second testing session. Charness suggests 
that this reduction in latency may be an indication that DH accessed chunks 
organized as a hierarchy. 
 Although generalization is risky with single-subject experiments, these 
results seem in harmony with the predictions of the chunking and template 
theories: increase in skill occurs mainly through differences in chunking 
(increase in the size of chunks, speed in accessing chunks, increase in 
selectivity) and not mainly through an increase in search mechanisms. Note that 
the chunk size (on average 2.7 pieces) was smaller than that predicted by the 
template theory, but this may be due to the recording technique used, similar to 
that used by Chase and Simon (1973a), which may break chunks down (Gobet 
& Simon, in press). The smaller inter-chunk latencies could speak in favor of 
this hypothesis. Although both SEEK and the LT-WM theory are not exposed 
in enough detail to offer an explanation of these results, two comments may be 
made. First, the size of DH’s tree search and of his maximal depth of search 
run counter to SEEK’s predictions that search is a key element of chess 
expertise. Second, the decrease in inter-chunk latencies could support the 
hypothesis of a retrieval structure. 
Discussion 
It is now time to summarize, for each theory, the positive and negative 
evidence (see Table 1). The reader is referred to the discussion at the end of 
each set of empirical data for details on the application of each theory. 
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---------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
 The chunking theory does better than is often stated in the literature. The 
reason is that most criticisms were aimed at the computer model MAPP (Simon 
& Gilmartin, 1973), which implemented only a subset of the chunking theory. 
The basic ideas (chunks are the units of perceptual learning, and it takes several 
seconds to create one of them) account for many results: recall with brief 
presentation time (even below 1 s); recall of game and random positions, as 
well as recall of actual and random games; dominant role of visuo-spatial 
encoding; and differential recall of positions modified by mirror image or by 
translation. Strong empirical evidence was also gained from studies aimed at 
identifying chunks. Assuming that chunks give access to a schematic semantic 
LTM (as mentioned, but not worked out in detail, by Chase and Simon, 1973b), 
the chunking theory accounts for the role of semantic orientation as well. The 
theory seems weak with respect to the interference studies (in particular with 
the multiple-board task) and high-level descriptions reported by masters, 
though additional assumptions on subjects’ strategies and on the size of chunks 
may salvage it in these cases. Finally, the eye-movement simulations reported 
in De Groot and Gobet (1996) were obtained with essentially a chunking 
model. 
 SEEK is harder to judge, because many mechanisms are left largely 
unspecified. Intuitively, it captures the high-level descriptions reported by 
masters, allowing it to give some explanation for the interference studies and 
the roles of semantic orientation. Its weaknesses are with the recall of very 
briefly presented positions, with random positions, with the evidence for 
chunks and with the effect of board modification. In addition, SEEK’s stress on 
verbal, in preference to visuo-spatial knowledge is not warranted by the data. 
Finally, SEEK does not say much about short-range learning. With long-range 
learning, it predicts larger changes in search parameters than observed by 
Charness (1989). 
 The square version of the LT-WM theory shares some of the difficulties 
shown by SEEK. Some data are not clearly handled, including interference 
studies, long-range learning, and evidence for chunks. Other data are directly at 
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variance with the predictions of the theory, such as recall of briefly presented 
positions and short-range learning. In particular, random positions are difficult 
to handle. Ericsson and Kintsch (1995, p. 237) stress that “The ability to store 
random chess positions provides particularly strong evidence for the ability to 
encode individual chess pieces into the retrieval structure.” The empirical data 
clearly refute this claim: with the recall of random positions, masters perform 
poorly with a presentation of 5 s (one third of the pieces correct), and even with 
a presentation of 60 s, they do not recall more than two thirds of the pieces 
correctly (both with visual and auditory presentation). The recall of random 
illegal games brings their recall of piece locations close to that of weak players. 
It is clear that masters do not benefit from a retrieval structure with such 
positions. Other negative pieces of evidence are offered by the fact that masters 
do not reach perfect recall with positions having only a few pieces on the board 
(“endgames”), and by the differential recall of positions modified by mirror 
image and by translation. Perhaps, the theory fares best with its explanation of 
the rapid access shown by masters to the piece location within a position. Thus, 
while the square version makes relatively clear predictions, these are in many 
cases at variance with the empirical data, due to an excessively powerful 
retrieval structure. 
 The hierarchy version of the LT-WM theory does a better job at accounting 
for the data, although it is vague in many respects. In particular, two points  
came out quite clearly from the application of this version to the empirical data. 
First, the rapid recognition of schemas and patterns plays a more important 
explanatory role than the storage of new information, which is the central thrust 
of the theory. Second, it was necessary several times to make the assumption 
that encoding times into the retrieval structure and into LTM were relatively 
slow, to prevent the hierarchy version of the theory running into the same 
problems as the square version. But this seems to run counter to one of 
Ericsson and Kintsch’s (1995) main points, that encoding should be fast and 
reliable with experts. 
 In a sense, the template theory incorporates the best of each of the previous 
theories; hence, it is not surprising that it accounts for most of the data 
reviewed. The concept of chunks accounts for the recall of game and random 
positions (as well as positions from actual and random games), for the 
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dominant role of visuo-spatial encoding, and for the differential recall of 
positions modified by mirror image or by translation. This concept also 
accounts, with additional assumptions reviewed earlier, for eye movements. 
The concept of templates, which is a mixture of the concepts of high-level 
description, chunks, and retrieval structure, is the key for explaining the 
interference and multiple-board results and the role of presentation time on 
recall of game positions. Since templates (and chunks) are connected to other 
nodes in semantic LTM, they account for the effects of semantic orientation 
and typicality.  
 Admittedly, the template theory and the LT-WM theory share many aspects: 
rapid encoding into LTM, importance of retrieval cues, small capacity of STM. 
The main difference between the two theories is illustrated by Figure 1. In the 
LT-WM treatment of most domains reviewed by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995), 
encoding through retrieval cues is not contingent upon the recognition of 
schemas in LTM; what I would call a generic retrieval structure is postulated. 
(Note that Ericsson and Kintsch’s treatment of text comprehension does not 
presuppose the presence of a generic retrieval structure but proposes two 
sources for retrieval structures: the episodic text structure, which is rapidly 
built up during the comprehension of a text, and LTM schemas. It is however 
debatable whether the episodic text  structure matches the criterion of stability 
proposed by Ericsson and Kintsch as defining retrieval structures; see Gobet, 
1997, for a discussion.) In the template approach, encoding into slots occurs 
after a schema has been accessed through perceptual cues. Templates offer 
partial retrieval structures that are specific to a class of positions. These two 
differences—specificity vs. generality of the retrieval structure, and partial vs. 
total ability of the structure to encode information—explain why one theory 
accounts successfully for most of the results reviewed here, and why the other 
fails (Gobet, 1997). While the general message of Ericsson and Kintsch—that 
encoding into LTM is faster than was supposed in earlier models—may be 
valid, the general mechanism they propose does not apply to the wide range of 
domains they claim it does. It is not the case that  generic retrieval structures 
develop within domains such as medical expertise or chess, or in other domains 
where there is no deliberate attempt to improve one’s memory. The concept of 
generic retrieval structure seems to offer a theoretically plausible explanation 
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mostly in domains where memory for order is important, where there is a 
conscious effort to both construct and use a memory structure under strategic 
control, and where the input is encoded serially. Chess, which offers a bi-
dimensional structure where reliance on the order of encoding is not important, 
and which is a domain where memory of positions is not a primordial goal, 
does not fit this description, nor do many (most?) other domains of expertise.  
 In addition to accounting for most of the empirical data on chess memory, 
the template theory, as did the chunking theory, offers a comprehensive theory 
of expertise, including perception, memory, and problem solving (see Gobet, 
1997, for an application of the theory to problem solving). It is embodied as a 
computer program, which permits precise tests of the theory to be carried out. 
While the generality of this theory outside the realm of chess has yet to be 
established, its kinship with the successful chunking theory indicates that its 
prospects are good. In addition, it is compatible with EPAM IV (Richman, 
Staszewski & Simon, 1995), which accounts for a large amount of empirical 
data from the learning and memory literature and has recently been used to 
simulate the behavior of a mnemonist specialized in the digit-span task, one of 
the tasks which led to the development of the skilled memory theory (Chase & 
Ericsson, 1982). 
 
 Several general conclusions that extend beyond the realm of chess may be 
formulated. First, the chunking theory fared very well, better than is normally 
proposed in the literature. Second, perception plays a critical role in cognition. 
This was already the message of De Groot, Chase and Simon. Interestingly, 
research in Artificial Intelligence (e.g., Brooks, 1992) now echoes these 
scientists. Third, comparing data across the traditional barriers of perception, 
memory, and problem solving offers definite advantages, as was most 
eloquently formulated by Newell (1973), including a reduction in the number 
of degrees of freedom allotted to the theory. As an example, consider the 
CHREST model, the computer instantiation of the template theory. Parameters 
derived from memory, such as those directing the creation of chunks, were 
used in simulating eye movements. Conversely, constraints on eye movements, 
such as the size of parafoveal vision, were used to simulate the creation of 
chunks.  
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 Fourth, the comparative method used in this paper clearly illustrates the 
weaknesses of verbal theories: vagueness, non-refutability, and ease of adding 
auxiliary assumptions, which may not be compatible with the core of the 
theory. For example, the auxiliary assumption that encoding times are slow, 
which I made repeatedly with the LT-WM theory to avoid its predicting too 
strong a recall performance, seems reasonable. However, it clashes with LT-
WM emphasis on rapid encoding times.  Noting the deficiencies of theories 
formulated verbally has been done frequently in the past, but had to be 
reiterated here, because many theories are still formulated only verbally in the 
research on expertise—chess is no exception. Of course, and fortunately, there 
are also quite a few attempts to frame theories in rigorous formalisms (e.g., the 
research carried out within the Soar and ACT-R frameworks). Fifth, the 
decision to prefer precise predictions within a specific domain to loose 
predictions across various domains has definite advantages. Not least of them 
is the fact that this approach recognizes the importance of the constraints 
imposed by the task domain (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Newell & Simon, 
1972). While it is important to search for general cognitive principles, such as 
the roles of chunking, retrieval structures, or high-level knowledge, one should 
not forget that each domain of expertise imposes constraints that critically 
shape behavior. These constraints may be lost when theories are compared 
loosely across several domains, which implies that the analysis of the match 
between theory and data is done at a general level, with the risk that too many 
"details" are lost. 
 The impact of chess research on cognitive science in general  and on the 
study of expertise in particular is important. The main features of chess 
expertise (selective search, memory for meaningful material in the domain of 
expertise, importance of pattern recognition) have been shown to be 
generalizable to other domains.  As shown in this paper, chess offers a rich 
database of empirical results that allows for testing theories of expert memory 
rigorously. In addition, built on previous information-processing models, a far-
ranging and consistent theory of chess players’ memory is now available, 
which offers a promising framework both for developing a complete model of 
chess expertise, including problem solving, and for unifying the vast body of 
experimental results within the study of expertise in general. Whether it will be 
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as successful in other domains of expertise, or whether another theory would 
fare better, has to be established by rigorously testing it against empirical data 
along several dimensions, as has been done in this paper for chess. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the two different types of encodings according to the 
LTWM theory. The top of the figure shows a hierarchical organization of 
retrieval cues associated with units of encoded information. The bottom of the 
figure depicts knowledge based associations relating units of encoded 
information to each other along with patterns and schemas.  (Adapted from 
Ericsson and Kinstch, 1995.) 
 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the processes carried out by MAPP. The 
upper part of the Figure depicts the learning phase, where chess patterns are fed 
to an EPAM-like discrimination net. The lower part illustrates MAPP 
processes during a recall task: (a) salient pieces in the stimulus position are 
detected; (b) salient pieces plus the pieces around them are fed to the 
discrimination net, which, when a chunk is recognized, outputs a symbol; (c) 
the chunk symbols are placed in STM; and (d) the position is reconstructed 
using the symbols in STM and the chunks they point to in LTM. (After Simon 


























Table 1: Overview of the Fit of the Four Theories with Empirical Data 
 
























    
Short presentation times + + ?/- - 
Eye movements + + ? ? 
 
STM recall and LTM encoding 
    
Interference studies - + ?/+ ?/+ 
Random positions + + - - 
Number of pieces + + + - 
Recall of games + + ?/- - 
 
Modality of representation 
    
Visual vs. verbal encoding + + - + 
 
LTM organization 
    
Evidence for chunks + + - ? 
Number of chunks  
(distorted positions) 
+ + - - 
Evidence for conceptual knowledge ? + + + 
Evidence for retrieval structure ?/+ ?/+ ?/+ ?/+ 
 
Learning 
    
Short-range + + ? - 
Long-range + + ?/- ?/+ 
 
 
Note:  “+” indicates that most data are accounted for by the 
theory;  
  “-” indicates that some data refutes the predictions of the 
theory;  
  “?” indicates that the theory does not make clear predictions 









 The ELO rating assumes that competitive chess players are distributed with a 
mean of 1500 and a standard deviation of 200.  In this paper, I will use the 
following denominations: grandmaster (>2500),  international master (2400-
2500), masters (2200-2400),  expert (2000-2200), class A players (1800-2000), 
class B players (1600-1800), and so on... 
2As noted by a reviewer, patterns and schemas play a key role in the LT-WM 
theory. It is therefore regrettable that Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) do not define 
these terms. Their usage seems compatible with the following definitions: a 
pattern is a configuration of parts into a coherent structure; a schema is a 
memory structure that is made both of fixed patterns and of slots where 
variable patterns may be stored. 
3De Groot's grandmaster was Max Euwe, world champion from 1935 to 1937. 
4The template theory emphasizes a limited-size visual STM, containing about 
three chunks (cf. Zhang & Simon, 1985), and somewhat downplays the role of 
verbal STM. The reason is that labels used by chess players to characterize 
types of positions can be quite long (e.g., “Minority attack in the Queen’s 
Gambit declined”), and may at best be seen as redundant encoding. This does 
not mean, however, that chessplayers do not use verbal memory—they do. The 
complete theory should incorporate a verbal STM as well, such as that 
proposed in EPAM IV by Richman et al. (1995), where the idea of chunk is 
combined by the concept of articulatory loop proposed by Baddeley (1986). 
5This version did not incorporate templates. De Groot and Gobet (1996) 
suggest that the same results obtain with the presence of templates. 
6As a matter a fact, De Groot (1946/1965) himself recommended to his subjects 
a waiting delay of about 30 s before reconstructing the position. This interval 
was supposed to allow the subject to “organize whatever he could remember.” 
Chase and Simon (1973b) also tested the effect of a waiting task with one of 
 60
 
their subjects and did not find any performance loss in recall in comparison 
with immediate recall. 
7
 While retrieval from LTM seems obvious when subjects were trying to 
remember a position for several minutes, other shorter latencies to retrieve the 
position do not forcibly speak for an exclusive access to LTM: the pointer may 
still be in STM, but time is needed to “unpack” it and to access the contents of 
chunks and templates. 
8Vicente and Wang (in press) note that, in most experiments, random positions 
are created by randomizing the location of pieces from game positions, and that 
no one has used positions where both the location on square and the piece 
distributions are randomized.  
9
 In blindfold chess, a player carries out one (or several) game(s) without seeing 
the board and the pieces (moves are indicated using standard chess notation). 
10Charness (1974) used 4x4 matrices that contained 8 pieces. 
11In this task, concurrent is defined as occurring after the dictation of each 
individual move. Posterior interference is defined as occurring after the 
dictation of a sequence of moves. 
12P = 100 - Bec(t-1), where P is the percentage correct, 100-B is the percentage 
memorized with one second,  c is the constant of proportionality, and t is the 
presentation time.    
